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Abstract 
  
The triple disaster of March 11, 2011 posed a formidable challenge for Japanese society in 
general, and for affected coastal communities in particular. In the immediate aftermath of 
the catastrophe, there was widespread support for the construction of high seawalls to 
protect communities. However, many communities began questioning this approach. In 
Maehama, the question of land-reconstruction and protection gave rise to a set of complex 
responses. The government aimed to put in place even higher seawalls; however, the local 
community proposed instead to mark the boundary of high water with trees and stakes. 
These solutions instantiate different ways of infrastructuring the post-tsunami environment 
for safety, and they carry different assumptions about infrastructure itself. Whereas the 
seawall solution was technical and quantitative, centering on the question of height, the 
boundary markers embedded a qualitatively different set of assumptions about what makes 
a workable infrastructure. In particular this difference centered on issue of visibility.  On 
the one hand, the seawall was meant to slowly become unremarkable, whereas the boundary 
markers were specifically intended to maintain community memory. On the other hand, the 
seawall would make the sea itself invisible, whereas keeping the sea in sight is very 
important to villagers. However, the opposition between these forms of infrastructuring the 
environment was not total. Slowly, a solution was negotiated in which the sea wall and the 
boundary markers could complement one another. This situation highlights the intricate and 
transformable relation between visible and invisible forms of infrastructure. 
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Introduction 
I met Konno-san, a stocky, gray-haired man in his early fifties, in his home village of 
Maehama 1  on the coast of Iwate Prefecture 2 . As we were talking over drinks in his 
temporary housing late one night in autumn 2012, Konno-san told me that his wife’s death 
in the tsunami of March 11, 2011 was ‘embarrassing.’ It was the first time he had spoken to 
me explicitly about her death, and his choice of words astonished me. He then dismissed 
the idea that his wife’s name should be inscribed in the village tsunami memorial, which 
was then being planned. ‘Only 30 people died out of 2,500 inhabitants…. She was not old 
like the other victims. Since Maehama has suffered from tsunamis repeatedly, the people 
living here should know to expect a tsunami after every big quake. Furthermore, the tsunami 
of March 11 hit the village more than 30 minutes after the quake was felt. I can’t bear to 
think about the neighbors gossiping about her death.’  
                                                 
1 Personal names and the village name have been changed. Administratively, the village 
referred to here as Maehama is a part of Ōfunato City, Iwate Prefecture. My first visit to 
Ōfunato was just one year before the tsunami (Kimura, 2014). I started field research on 
the disaster there two months after the tsunami. During the first year after the tsunami, I 
traveled there regularly and conducted interviews with survivors, public officials, and 
volunteers. Since the beginning of 2012, two urban planning colleagues of mine, Hirotaka 
Ikeda and Shin Aiba, and I have supported reconstruction efforts in Maehama including 
drafting local reconstruction plans (Kimura, 2015).  
2 The prefectures most severely affected by the disaster of March 11 were Iwate, Miyagi, 
Fukushima, and Ibaraki. Since Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima are geographically included 
in the Tohoku region, ‘Tohoku’ is often used as a synonym for the entire area affected by 
the disaster. 
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Konno-san believed that his wife had both had sufficient warning and ability to 
evacuate, yet she had failed to do so. So why did his wife underestimate the tsunami? We 
can no longer hear the story from her lips. Maybe it was because she was not a native of the 
village (she was born and raised in Tokyo). Perhaps the false tsunami warning that happened 
a few days prior to the disaster led her to misjudge the threat. According to Konno-san and 
other locals, however, the eight-meter seawall enclosing the cove of Maehama was 
undoubtedly a crucial factor in her decision. Konno-san speculated that his wife had stayed 
home because she believed the seawall would protect her. In other words, the existence of 
the seawall suggested to her that experts were confident that no tsunami would rise above 
it. 
The triple or ‘four-fold’ (Takahashi, 2011) disaster of March 11, 2011 inflicted 
devastating damage on Japan. At 2:46 PM, a mega-earthquake of 9.0 magnitude occurred 
off the northeastern coast of Honshu Island. This earthquake triggered the aforementioned 
massive tsunami, which in turn caused a severe accident at the Fukushima nuclear power 
plant. According to the Japanese Police Agency, the disaster killed more than 15,000 people 
directly and approximately 3,000 more indirectly.3 The Cabinet Office of Japan estimates 
the financial toll at about 17 trillion Japanese yen, making it the most costly disaster ever. 
Borrowing Numazaki Ichiro’s words (2012), the disaster was, and still is, ‘too wide, too big, 
too complicated to comprehend.’  
Although the number of casualties was far smaller than those associated with other 
catastrophic disasters such as the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004 or the Haiti Earthquake of 
2010, it posed a formidable challenge to Japanese society. Even now, some four years after 
the disaster, approximately 250,000 people are still evacuated or displaced. The process of 
recovery has been slow, and it is quite uncertain when, or if, things will get back to normal. 
This is not only because of the massive scale of damage, including the nuclear accident, but 
also because of the economic decline that has plagued Japan since the 1990s. Furthermore, 
the large-scale restructuring and integration of local governmental institutions conducted 
over the last two decades has disempowered local communities. Given the historical 
dependence of local economies on the government,4 it is very difficult for them to escape 
                                                 
3 Statistically death caused by strained living environment in shelters, mental stress, or 
other indirect reason caused by the disaster is categorized as ‘shinsai kanren shi’ (disaster-
related death).  
4 Some historians underline that Japan’s modernization has required continued sacrifice in 
the Tohoku region. For example, Akasaka et al. (2011) argue that Tohoku has been a 
virtual internal colony in Japan, assuming a role of the main source of labor, crop, and 
energy (including electricity from nuclear power plants) for Japan’s economic growth. 
Since the 1960s, the central government has attempted to improve the situation through 
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this situation by themselves.  
Considering the vulnerability of local communities, Konno-san’s story is at once 
evocative and ironic. Whether his wife underestimated the force of nature or was 
overconfident in the public systems in place for disaster prevention, her mistake was proved 
only as she was swallowed by the tsunami. In any case, it is important to note that her 
expectations were apparently based, consciously or unconsciously, on what Anthony 
Giddens (1991) calls ‘the expert system’ embedded in the seawall. In this sense, her personal 
story exemplifies that the disaster was experienced as ‘soutei-gai’ (beyond expectation). As 
an expression of surprise, soutei-gai became a buzzword used to characterize the triple 
disaster after high-level bureaucrats and spokespersons for TEPCO (Tokyo Electronic 
Company) repeatedly used it on television to deny responsibility for the disaster. Later, 
through studying the evidence and the spokespersons’ statements, citizens concluded that 
the company’s expectations had been unreasonably optimistic. The company had knowingly 
collected data only on ‘reasonably expectable and manageable’ events and refrained from 
taking into account data on ‘unlikely’ events (cf. Morita, Blok, and Kimura, 2013). 
Manipulating their own expectations in this way, the company had ensured that many future 
events could be categorized simply as soutei-gai -- beyond expectations. 
From deciding on the height of the seawall to determining building standards for 
nuclear power plants and the locations of public shelters,5 official (un)expectations were 
thus embedded in the existing public safety infrastructure. Not surprisingly, therefore, the 
discrepancy between these expectations and the reality of the tsunami resulted in many 
instances of soutei-gai. At the same time, due to outwards appearance of invulnerability 
meant elements of the public safety infrastructure, such as the seawall, promoted a sense of 
security. This permitted residents to adopt, consciously or unconsciously, an attitude of 
complacency or carelessness (cf. Sayre, 2011).  
The survivors’ reactions to the government-led reconstruction projects after the 2011 
tsunami have been ambivalent and complicated. In the immediate aftermath of the tsunami, 
many people embraced the government’s plan to raise the height of the seawalls even further 
to protect their communities from the next great tsunami. As things slowly began returning 
                                                 
the Comprehensive National Development Plans, but these plans had the 
counterproductive outcome of reinforcing the dependency of local communities on 
governmental subsidy and public works projects such as large-scale construction of 
transportation infrastructure.  
5 In accordance with the law, each municipality had designated a public shelter for 
emergencies in each neighborhood in advance. However, the ‘unexpectedly’ high water 
levels associated with the tsunami of March 11 submerged several shelters and killed the 
evacuees.  
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to ‘normal,’ however, people also increasingly began questioning this strategy. Some 
doubted whether higher seawalls are indeed worth the enormous amount of time, money 
and construction materials required by the project. Others worry that higher seawalls will 
make coastal residents less aware of the risk of future tsunamis, the consequences of which 
will be defined simply as soutei-gai. 
Different values and visions regarding the reconstruction of disaster management 
facilities have emerged in the course of these discussions. While some demand that new 
forms of safety infrastructure are installed as soon as possible, others are in favor of a longer 
process of planning. Whereas the government intends to build uniform seawalls in every 
affected community, based on scientific considerations alone, other voices urge that the 
unique landscapes and community conditions should be taken into account in determining 
socially acceptable designs. Still others recommend that the new public infrastructure 
should not take the form of seawalls at all, but instead center on making public reminders 
of impact on the tsunami on the locality. 
This situation corresponds perfectly with Susan Leigh Star’s famous definition of 
infrastructure as that which ‘becomes visible upon breakdown’ (Star and Ruhleder, 1996). 
The seawalls formerly in place were literally broken down, and the concept of seawalls is 
now on the table with its black box open (in Latour’s sense). But what would be a good 
outcome of this tragic story? Is it preferable, as government officials hope, to close anew 
the black box of safety infrastructure, making the seawall unnoticed and the seawall 
unremarkable? Or is a better alternative found in local responses focusing on developing a 
safety infrastructure that will remain visible testimony to historical events and future 
dangers? Exploring these ongoing discussions concerning seawalls and safety 
infrastructures after the tsunami, I argue that they offer a fresh vantage point for considering 
what constitutes a good safety infrastructure. As I show, these discussions center not only 
on the technical specifications of seawalls, but also, critically, on the location and forms of 
visibility and invisibility these walls are given within local communities and landscapes. If 
these qualitative dimensions of infrastructure development are taken into account it may be 
possible to overcome the binary choice between invisible and visible infrastructure. 
 
 
Safety, infrastructure, visibility 
The controversy over the reconstruction of public safety infrastructure after the tsunami is 
located at the intersection of two forms of inquiry: the study of safety and of infrastructure.  
As Michel Foucault (2009) pointed out, safety is one of the key concepts of modern 
governmentality. As statistics and the concept of risk were established in 18th and 19th 
Century France, new governmental technologies also emerged, centering on the question of 
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how to manage the environment in a way that would promote harmonious relations between 
people and things. Anthropologists of biosecurity have followed his seminal work in recent 
explorations of contemporary approaches to the ‘defense’ of society. Andrew Lakoff (2008), 
for example, characterizes large-scale computer of the spread of infectious disease as a ‘vital 
system’ for an emerging mode of governmentality. Its particular rationality, he argues, 
centers on generating a perpetual state of preparedness rather than aiming for prevention. In 
a related vein, Limor Samimian-Darash (2009) has analysed the Israeli biosecurity system 
as based on a ‘pre-event configuration,’ which enables the government to recognize, 
diagnose, and respond to unforeseen threats.  
In addition, Stavrianakis et al. (2011, 1; see also Collier and Lakoff, 2008) note that 
‘the rise of new security frameworks within government apparatuses are increasingly 
[directed] to “low-probability/high-consequence” events rather than civil defense and all-
hazards planning.’ Yet given the impossibility of predicting all hazardous events, how is it 
possible to implement a comprehensive approach for mitigating risk? According to 
Stavrianakis et al., this ‘vital system’ focuses on capacity building. By indirectly cultivating 
citizens’ capacity to prepare for critical events (cf. Deleuze, 1992), this is an approach that 
aims to mobilize citizens to become cogs in the governmental system. This theoretical 
framework provides one perspective through which we can examine the Japanese 
government’s system of natural disaster management. Compared to the sophistication of the 
biosecurity system of the United States, the former may look poorly organized and out of 
date. Nevertheless, it, too, emphasizes non-structural human elements alongside structural 
measurements. Moreover, it, too, gains legitimation based on statistical calculation.  
As a complex aggregate of technologies for managing the circulation of human and 
nonhuman agents, infrastructure is important for governmental aspirations to control 
citizens’ conduct. According to one recent definition, infrastructure ‘facilitate[s] the flow of 
goods, people, or ideas and allows for their exchange over space’ (Larkin 2013, 328). Under 
the influence of Marxist theory, which characterizes infrastructure as the material and 
technical base upon which social action rests, scholars in the tradition of STS (science and 
technology studies) have examined how social interactions are conditioned and 
(re)produced by the invisible base of infrastructure. Since social interaction in turn shape 
infrastructure, this is a dialectical position focusing on the mutual shaping of infrastructures 
and subjects.  
Along these lines, Leigh Star and Geoffrey Bowker, argued for the importance of 
seeing infrastructure not as a determined stage, but rather as a network of elements gradually 
assembled, maintained, or abandoned (Star and Ruhleder, 1996; Star 1999; Bowker and Star, 
1999; also Edwards et al., 2009). Related ANT-inspired approached, which have flourished 
in STS and anthropology, have examined the relation between social interaction, local 
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political ecology and infrastructures such as water and sewage systems (Anand, 2011; 
Jensen, 2014), roads (Thévenot, 2002; Dalakoglou, 2010), and informal communication 
infrastructures (e.g. Elyachar, 2010).  
  Some anthropologists of infrastructure have critically reexamined Star’s claim that 
infrastructure becomes ‘visible upon breakdown’ (see Larkin 2013). Their key observation 
is that infrastructure can take on different meanings and thus different visibilities for 
different people, at different times, and in different places. For example, a large-scale piece 
of infrastructure may be treated as a monument. Or the act of breaking ground for a new 
highway or launching a satellite may be defined as a national project. Meanwhile, a regional 
information hub can be the target of terrorism, and a waste-disposal facility can be seen as 
a nuisance to comfortable community life. To put it simply, infrastructure is not always 
infrastructure only in a material sense: it can have many other symbolic or imaginative 
capacities. In consequence there is no simple binary between the visibility and invisibility 
of infrastructure. What is visible or invisible changes depending on viewpoint, it varies over 
time, and it is subject to negotiation.  
  The demands for new seawalls made by survivors of the tsunami are worth 
reexamining in this light. Because of the generally massive shape of seawalls, diverse 
concerns over their design tend to be reduced to the one-dimensional issue of wall height. 
Yet, the recent work on the anthropology of infrastructure just mentioned, suggests the 
importance of examining the issue of visibility and invisibility with more care and attention. 
How, indeed, are seawalls supposed to function? What kinds of visibility or invisibility are 
they meant to engender, and for whom? What actions or inactions are they presumed to 
facilitate?  
The Japanese mass media has repeatedly reported about local worries that high 
seawalls would interfere with their view of the sea, thus changing the very landscape of the 
affected communities. In fact, ‘our vision of the sea will be obstructed’ is the most 
widespread expression of the affected communities’ anxiety about the proposed seawalls. 
Locals are adamant that, without a view of the sea, it will be hard for fishermen to continue 
their usual practice of watching the ‘face’ of the sea. Indeed, according to the folklorist 
Kawashima Shuichi (2012), who has explored the traditional knowledge and practices of 
local fishermen, having a view of the sea is a crucial element for making a successful catch. 
Local fishermen start their days by watching ‘unadura’ (the ‘face’ of the sea). Based on the 
signs they perceive in the color of the sea, the state of the waves, the feel of the clouds and 
the direction of the wind, they make daily decisions on fishing strategies. They also 
determine where they are (‘yama ate’) by observing landmarks on the shore (e.g. mountain 
peaks, capes, or tall buildings). In this manner, their knowledge of fishery is inseparable 
from their vision of the landscape.  
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Moreover, if the sea is rendered invisible it will be difficult for people to decide 
whether they should evacuate in the case of future emergencies. This, too, is related to local 
practices, including a heterogeneous collection of local sayings, behavior patterns, and 
social arrangements, called ‘saigai-bunka’ (disaster culture) by the social scientists who 
have explored it. As time goes by, or if the landscape changes, as it would do dramatically 
with the introduction of giant seawalls, there is a significant risk that such saigai-bunka will 
cease working effectively. Of course, as Konno-san’s tragic story suggest, disaster culture 
is not necessarily sufficient to prevent disaster. 
Even so, what these observations indicate is that the completion of new large seawalls 
may well increase the risk to public safety, in the manner suggested by soutei-gai stories 
suggest, since the walls would slowly blind residents to the dangers of the sea. 
It is also not obvious that a lower seawall would be preferable. Indeed, what the local 
people want seems inconsistent: they want both a safer built environment and preserving 
visible awareness of the danger of natural disasters. This poses the question of whether there 
is any way to avoid the sentiment expressed in the Japanese saying that Natural disasters 
strike when we forget about them’? In other words, is it possible to feel safer without for 
that matter becoming less attentive to the remaining risk of catastrophe? 
What is at stake here is the question of how people sort out the entangled and 
antagonistic relations between diverse forms of visibility and invisibility, between 
infrastructure and obstruction, between past experience and future plans, and between daily 
life and emergencies, in the context of a changing landscape.  
Taking it a step further, it appears to me that what people seek is a visible and public 
safety infrastructure. Below, I describe some local attempt to achieve this infrastructure, by 
attending to at once to the experience of past tsunamis and to the anticipation of future 
tsunamis.  
  
From evacuation to protection 
Major natural disasters often lead to the reform of disaster management systems. The 
Disaster Basic Law, which specifies today’s general framework for disaster management in 
Japan, was legislated in 1961 after a typhoon had killed more than 5,000 people two years 
previously. The law stated that natural disasters should primarily be tackled by the local 
municipalities with support from the central and prefectural governments, and in 
cooperation with local residents.6 During this period, the engineering approach to disaster 
management, including the construction of concrete riverbanks and seawalls, became 
                                                 
6 Roughly speaking, Japan’s administrative structure is three-layered, consisting of the 
central government, prefectural governments, and local municipalities.  
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dominant, at least in the public discourse.7 In the following, I discuss three major tsunamis 
(1933, 1960, and 2011) each of which affected the local public safety infrastructure of the 
Pacific coast communities of northeastern Japan.   
  As Konno-san recalled, a major tsunami can be expected to hit this area once every 
several decades. Statistically speaking, therefore, every inhabitant of this area is expected 
to experience a tsunami once or twice in his or her life. In spite of these disasters, people 
continue to live along the seashore, taking advantage of the abundant natural resources. To 
cope with the risk, they maintain traditions including the telling of stories that convey the 
collective memory of previous tsunamis. Thus, when the ground trembled violently in the 
middle of a winter night in 1933, older residents rushed the younger villagers to higher 
ground. They do so because they remembered the Meiji Sanriku Tsunami of 1896, which 
had killed about 22,000 people8 and destroyed 12,000 homes. As a result, although the 1933 
tsunami destroyed thousands of houses and devastated the area, the death toll was much 
lower than in 1896.9  
The official report by Iwate Prefecture (Iwate-ken Doboku-ka, 1935) described the 
damage in detail. One section outlines the effect on a hamlet of Maehama: ‘All the houses 
near the shoreline were washed away. The tsunami intruded deep [into the hamlet] along the 
course of the small river. Only the big houses in the back remain standing without changes 
in appearance. [Local people] affirmed that tsunami height was about 8 meters by eye.’  
After the 1933 tsunami, the central government did not leave the recovery process in 
the hands of local people. During this time, Japan was going to war in East Asia, and the 
government wished to create a strong sense of national power. Based on the advice of 
Imamura Aritsune, the leading seismologist of the time, the government promoted collective 
relocation to higher ground in the devastated areas. People who had lost their houses in the 
tsunami readily accepted this idea. With the aid of government funding, the residents of the 
affected communities prepared the slopes of nearby hills and mountains for housing. As a 
result, approximately 2,200 houses in 28 communities in Iwate Prefecture were rebuilt on 
higher ground within the next several years. This government-led relocation project 
effectively transformed the spatial layout of the coastal communities. Maehama was 
                                                 
7 The so-called Kobe Earthquake of 1995 set public discourse on a new track, as the 
mutual assistance provided by residents of the affected area and the volunteer work 
offered by citizens from neighboring areas highlighted the insufficiency of the local 
municipalities’ capacity to deal with either the emergency or the subsequent long-term 
recovery process.   
8 Maehama lost half of its population of 2,500 to the tsunami in 1896.  
9 It is estimated that the Showa Sanriku tsunami in 1933 killed about 3,000 people and 
destroyed 11,000 houses.  
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considered one of the most successful cases since almost all of the 200 destroyed houses 
were rebuilt in its four so-called ‘fukkouchi.’  
In addition, Asahi Shimbun, one of Japan’s major newspaper companies, used donated 
funds to raise stone monuments commemorating the tsunami in the affected communities. 
These monuments bore inscriptions such as ‘Watch for tsunami after every big quake,’ and 
‘Don’t build a house lower than this point.’ In this way, not only did the fukkouchis and the 
monuments become part of the local landscapes of the affected communities, they also 
became material and symbolic means of increasing tsunami awareness and of reminding 
people to evacuate to safe areas.  
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Figure 1. A stone monument installed in Ōfunato after the tsunami of 1933. It says 
“Remember that a big, prolonged quake is the warning for a tsunami. Evacuate immediately 
to nearest higher ground and stay there at least for an hour” (by Shuhei Kimura) 
 
 
  After a thirty-year interval, another large tsunami – this time coming from the other 
side of the Earth – reached the coasts in 1960. This tsunami was called the Chilean 
Earthquake Tsunami, since it had been generated by a big earthquake in the Pacific Ocean 
near Chile. In Japan, it killed about 140 people. This tsunami was dramatically different 
from the previous two ones. The wave height in the coastal area was much lower, and 
because the point of origin was very far away, the waves were so slow that they took half 
an hour to arrive and half an hour to withdraw. Some survivors told me that people were 
able to walk on the sea floor and gather fish and clams while the waves were out. Prior to 
2011, this was the biggest tsunami in living memory. Consequently it shaped the local image 
of what a tsunami was like.  
After the Chilean Earthquake Tsunami, a large-scale public investment in seawall 
construction was launched. The seawalls were built in the 1960s, a period of rapid economic 
growth.10 The protection of the coastline had been on the government agenda prior to the 
1960 tsunami, since yearly typhoons were causing a large number of casualties. The Coast 
Act was enacted in 1956 and the Building Standard for Shore Protection Facilities in 1958. 
A severe typhoon killed more than 5,000 people in 1959, the year before the Chilean 
Earthquake Tsunami. Subsequently, the Disaster Basic Law was enacted. Henceforth all 
towns and villages on the Pacific coastline were to be enclosed by seawalls as part of the 
national public works project.  
It is noteworthy that most of the seawalls constructed in this period were only a few 
meters high, much lower than those currently under consideration. The reason was that their 
primary aim was to block high waves caused by typhoons and moderate-height tsunamis 
like the Chilean Earthquake Tsunami, rather than more dramatic but infrequent events like 
the tsunamis of 1896 or 1933. At the time it was said that it would not be feasible to build 
                                                 
10 As mentioned above (in note 4), in 1962, the Japanese central government launched a 
series of five-year Comprehensive National Development Plans, aimed at developing rural 
areas through New Deal-like large-scale public works that included the construction of 
infrastructure such as roads and dams. Although the central government supported this 
construction-oriented approach at the time, this policy is now considered to have had 
harmful effects on Japan’s administrative system. 
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higher seawalls. Moreover, the government did not have reliable data on the heights of these 
earlier tsunamis. For this reason, the Chilean Earthquake Tsunami established not only the 
local image of tsunamis but also the official standards for anti-tsunami infrastructure. 
Fortunately or unfortunately, these low seawalls were exactly the right height to block the 
tsunami that hit the area in 1968. Along with the discourse formed by the Disaster Basic 
Law, this success helped to cement the structure-oriented framework of tsunami 
countermeasures in Japan. Thus, it popularized and strengthened the belief that tsunamis 
could be mitigated exclusively by means of seawalls. In the 1980s, the seawalls were raised 
by several meters because of widespread anticipation of the so-called Tokai Earthquake, 
which experts believed was imminent (though it has not occurred to date). Yet although the 
experts began emphasizing earthquakes, this did not cause them to revise their general 
framework for disaster prevention.  
I suggest that the seawalls index a shift in the mode of public safety infrastructure from 
structures supporting evacuation to structures providing protection. While older safety 
devices such as stone monuments and fukkouchis added to the everyday landscape of local 
communities, the seawalls enclosed the communities, creating a division between land and 
sea. Although the seawalls did not obstruct the view of the sea very significantly, they 
concealed the danger inherent in living in the coastal communities, replacing living memory 
with ‘evidence’ of past events. Yet, as noted, despite the lack of sufficient scientific data 
and, thus, of technical justification for the chosen height of the seawalls, these walls became 
the basis of a structure-oriented framework of tsunami prevention and a myth of safety. Thus, 
the anthropologist Ryan Sayre (2013) recalls that, not long before the 2011 disaster, when 
he asked a disaster preparedness expert about tsunamis, she replied without hesitation that 
‘Tsunami preparedness is over…. The problem has been overcome.’  
 
Reassessing risk 
The ‘thousand-year tsunami’ following the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011 shattered 
the public myth of safety. It revealed the fragility of Japanese society on a scale reminiscent 
of Japan’s defeat in World War II (Murakami, 2011). Nevertheless, despite the obvious 
insufficiency of the existing system, the tsunami only served to strengthen the bureaucratic 
framework underlying Japan’s the disaster prevention efforts. In other words, the tsunami 
did not cause an ‘overflow’ to the practices and strategies of disaster management (Callon, 
1998; Hilgartner, 2007). Reviewing the national tsunami hazard map in the aftermath of the 
tsunami, the Central Disaster Prevention Council under the Cabinet Office recommended 
that the government should prepare for another gigantic tsunami, regardless of its low 
probability. Based on this recommendation, the government identified two (ambiguously 
defined) levels of tsunami.  
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L1: A tsunami that is destructive yet small enough to have a relatively high likelihood 
of occurrence. Damage from this kind of tsunami should be prevented through 
structural protection. The goal is the improvement of structures.  
L2: The largest tsunami possible in the area. This kind of tsunami cannot be mitigated 
through structural protection alone. Thus the goal must be the development of 
comprehensive, multi-layered measures.11  
  
Given the costs and benefits of various possible seawall designs, the government decided to 
construct the seawalls at a height that would block L1 tsunamis only. Since an L2 tsunami 
must be expected to run over the seawall, its destruction must be prevented through 
‘comprehensive, multi-layered measures,’ that include structural measures as well as non-
structural measures such as residents’ quick reactions. 
While local municipalities essentially have the responsibility for reconstruction in each 
community, at this time the prefectural governments are in charge of the large-scale seawall 
reconstruction project. Given the ambiguity of the definitions of tsunami type, each 
prefectural government could interpret them in their own way, and set the heights for the 
proposed seawalls according to their own standards. In Iwate Prefecture, for example, the 
expert committee interpreted the description of L1 to mean ‘the height of a tsunami that is 
likely to occur more than once every two hundred years.’ They then, rather arbitrarily, 
divided the coastline of Iwate into 24 units and assessed the heights of past tsunamis within 
each. Within this system, the main cove of Maehama was placed within the 20th unit 
together with the cove of a neighboring community, while the other two coves of Maehama 
were assigned to the 19th unit. The expert committee subsequently defined the exact heights 
of L1 and L2 tsunamis for each unit based on ‘reliable’ evidence of past tsunamis. For unit 
20, for example, the committee classified the tsunamis of 1896 and 2011 as examples of L2 
tsunamis and those of 1933 and 1960 as examples of L1 tsunamis. At the end of the process, 
they determined the maximum height of an L1 tsunami in unit 20 to be 13.1 meters above 
sea level.  
In the summer of 2011, about six months after the tsunami, the prefectural government 
presented Maehama with three options for the height of a new seawall for the main cove: 
14.1 meters (L1 height for the entire unit plus 1 meter), 8.7 meters (L1 height for the cove 
plus 1 meter), and 7.9 meters (same height as the existing seawall). The officials did not 
hide their preference for the highest wall. To my surprise, few locals objected explicitly to 
                                                 
11 Although the government published its English version, I translate these sentences by 
myself to convey the feel of the original Japanese text.  
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this preference, which would double the height of the existing wall. Perhaps this was 
because most people welcomed a radical reform of the disaster management system so soon 
after the disaster. At that time, they may not have truly comprehended the long-term effects 
of this decision on their daily lives. As I discuss below, a negative view of the tall seawall 
only gradually emerged.  
 
Another project: marking the border  
Apart from the discussion over seawalls, alternative responses to the devastation have also 
appeared gradually. These responses have taken the form of structures that alter the 
landscape of the affected communities in order to remind residents of the risk of tsunamis. 
In Rikuzen Takata, for example, a town just south of Ōfunato, a newly-organized non-profit 
organization named ‘Sakura Line 311’ has launched a project to plant sakura (cherry trees) 
at ten meter intervals along the border of the flooded area for the entire length of the town. 
As is well known, cherry blossoms are central Japanese symbol, and people gather under 
the cherry trees when they blossom in the spring. The founder of Sakura Line 311, a young 
man who grew up in Rikuzen Takata and returned to live there in the aftermath of the 
tsunami, told me that his vision is for people to remember the tsunami when the cherry 
blossoms bloom. At the same time, this makes the borderline of high water easily visible. 
Moreover, he hopes that the line of trees will help future generations understand the vast 
destruction of March 11 tsunami, and that they will offer a guide for evacuation in the case 
of the next tsunami.  
Another example is from a small hamlet in Maehama. During a visit to this hamlet in 
support of reconstruction efforts12, we suggested to the locals that they build a tsunami 
memorial. They accepted this idea, choosing to mark the border of the flooded area. With 
the project installed by Sakura Line 311 in mind, an urban planning colleague of mine 
advised them to use cherry or camellia trees (the symbol of Ōfunato city) to mark the high 
water line. The locals, however, believed that a boundary line made of such trees would 
soon become indistinguishable from the surrounding landscape. Instead, they proposed to 
use wooden stakes. These one-and-a-half-meter stakes, the head of the hamlet explained, 
would attract attention by virtue of being artificial in a rural landscape. In economical terms, 
the stakes are much cheaper than stone because wood is abundant in the mountains near the 
hamlet. The residents of the hamlet were aware that the stakes would decay within a few 
decades, but they anticipated that future generations would replace them when they wore 
out, thus refreshing their memory of the tsunami.  
We also proposed that they decorate the stakes, but this suggestion, too, was rejected. 
                                                 
12 See note 1. 
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Instead, a minimal amount of information was written on each stake: simply informing 
readers that the stakes mark the high-water line of the tsunami associated with the Great 
East Japan Earthquake, and providing the date of the catastrophe. Their repeated rejections 
of our ideas in favor of their own impressed us: they knew what they needed to add to the 
landscape to achieve their own purposes.  
In contrast with ‘the mode of prevention’ represented by the seawall, these projects are 
in line with what I have called ‘the mode of evacuation;’ a mode that also includes the older 
stone monuments and fukkachous. In some ways, building higher seawalls and marking the 
high-water line is in some incongruent, if not opposed. For example, if the force of the next 
tsunami is weakened by the seawall, the location of the previous high-water line should be 
less significant. Indeed, given the totally different wave heights of the tsunamis of 1896, 
1933, 1960, and 2011, marking the high-water level of one tsunami with great precision is 
not necessarily very important. But then, the purpose of marking the high-water line of the 
2011 tsunami is not primarily to demarcate a guaranteed safety zone. Instead, as the head of 
Sakura Line 311 said, it merely offers a guide for evacuation.  
On closer inspection, the mode of building high seawalls and that of marking the high-
water line are opposed on even more fronts. First, while the seawalls represent the predicted 
vertical height of expected future tsunamis, the boundary markers record past tsunamis 
planimetrically. Second, while the seawalls divide the land and the sea, the markers are 
embedded within the original landscape. Third, while the seawalls obstruct the view of the 
sea, the markers supplement their view, thus allowing them to imagine the potential 
destruction that a tsunami could cause while also allowing a view of the present natural 
landscape. Fourth, while the seawalls are gigantic stand-alone structures, the markers are 
small, numerous, and coordinated. Finally, while the seawalls is likely to be decreasingly 
noticed as time passes, the boundary markers, whether in the form of trees or stakes, will be 
more or less visible at various times of the year. My key point, however, is not to simply to 
contrast these approaches. It is that they are indicative of entirely different disaster 
mitigation practices and strategies. These practices and strategies reflect different, 
inconsistent visions not only of the landscape, but also of time, as one mode looks to past 
experience, while the other is fixed on predicting the future. In other words, they imply 
different ways of infrastructuring environments for safety information.  
As mentioned above, a large proportion of survivors, not only fishermen but also office 
workers, maintain that a good view of the ocean is a vital part of their community because 
they have been accustomed to such a view all their lives. Of course seawalls did exist prior 
to the tsunami of March 11, and although they were much lower than the new walls now 
being considered, they did partially obstruct the view. Precisely for this reason, 
immeadiately after the March 11 earthquake, residents of Maehama who wanted to watch 
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for a coming tsunami rushed to the fukkouchis. 
For the villagers, having a view of the sea thus does not necessarily mean being able 
to see it from anywhere. Rather, what is needed is certain places in the village from which 
the sea will always remain visible. Although these claims can be defined in terms of a 
demand to lower the height of the seawall, the height is not the only issue at stake. The 
larger issue is how to build better public safety infrastructure, infrastructuring the 
environment in a way that also allows for the preservation of an organic, everyday 
relationship with the landscape. Locals are convinced that they can stay in close vicinity of 
the sea and yet defend themselves from natural disasters inasmuch as this relationship is 
maintained.   
In contrast, officials from the local government consider the height of the proposed 
seawalls to be non-negotiable. They underline the importance of a long-term perspective in 
order to prepare for infrequent large tsunamis of the future. To their eyes, the unwillingness 
of local people to embrace radical infrastructural change speaks only to their 
shortsightedness. 
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Figure 2.  One of ten wooden stakes installed in a small hamlet in Maehama (by Shuhei 
Kimura) 
 
Toward a visible infrastructure 
In the winter of 2012, the fourteen-meter seawall proposed for Maehama reemerged as a 
problem. This slow reaction made Maehama in some sense atypical, for some communities 
were objected to what they saw as the harmful effects of a high seawall during the early 
stages of planning. Supported by scholars and intellectuals, these communities held study 
sessions to examine the planned seawall reconstruction projects and issued statements 
against them. Even so, they have had great difficulty in actually changing the heights of the 
planned seawalls. In general terms, they are blocked by Japan’s compartmentalized and rigid 
hierarchical administrative structure. According to this structure, a local municipality 
complies with the official policies and implicit instructions of the prefectural government, 
and the prefectural government complies with those of the central government.  
Within this bureaucratic hierarchy, each level internalizes the authority and oversight 
of the levels above, and the lowest levels are expected to adhere most rigidly to rules and 
regulations. Although the central government frequently communicates its openness to 
flexible interpretations of the rules, in practice officials from local municipalities are thus 
very reluctant to deliver local opinions and requests to the prefectural government. One 
level up, officials from the prefectural government are similarly reluctant to report 
prefectural concerns to the national government. It thus quite convenient for officials to hide 
behind a uniform ‘scientific’ standard and decline the diverse requests from local 
communities in the name of fairness.  
In this context, it would therefore be most helpful to local citizens if different opinions 
could be more easily accommodated within the government-led reconstruction project. That 
would entail creating a possibility for individual villages’ requests for lower seawalls to be 
presented to bureaucrats at each level, not only the lowest one. Retelling Maehama’s 
struggle not to lower the seawall but rather to build a more visible form of infrastructure, I 
explore one possible way to deal with this challenge.  
In the winter of 2012, we participated in the drafting process for the village’s 
reconstruction plan. Based on interviews with a variety of Maehama residents, my urban 
planning colleagues proposed a new land-use plan for the central area of the village. It 
included a planned park and a tsunami-prevention forest in the area adjacent to the central 
cove. Since this area had been flooded by the tsunami of March 11, we expected that the 
local municipality would regulate land use in this area. By prohibiting residents from 
rebuilding houses there, the municipality would open the area for use as a park and a forest, 
something imagined to help revitalize community life in Maehama.  
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Unexpectedly, however, the municipality declared that it would not prohibit the 
building of homes throughout the formerly flooded area. In accordance with guidelines, they 
determined that land use regulation would be implemented only in areas that they predicted 
would be inundated with more than two meters of water in a future L2 tsunami. This 
prediction, and thus the size and shape of the areas where home building would be 
prohibited, depended heavily on the predicted success of the proposed higher seawalls. Put 
simply, the higher the seawalls, the smaller the predicted flood area. Along with the core 
members of the residents’ association, we were perplexed. In the absence of effective land 
use regulation, our plan to rebuild a safer village would never work. It seemed likely that, 
even if locals who had survived the 2011 tsunami declined to rebuild their houses in the 
formerly flooded area, over the years newcomers and younger generations would come to 
disregard the history of the area. It might well be full of new buildings within a few decades. 
In sum, the municipality’s decision not to regulate land use would invite another round of 
soutei-gai. 
Here, the seawalls ‘became visible’ once more as local expectations broke down. Since 
the village’s future now depending entirely on these walls, people started to come to terms 
with their actual projected size. Moreover, they realized, the construction plan presented by 
the municipality had no gate in the seawall. Officials from the municipality said that a 
gateless wall was chosen to reduce both risk and cost. However, the absence of a gate also 
meant that local people would have to climb over the seawall to access the port and the 
fishery. This would be inconvenient for fishermen trying to conduct their daily business, 
and would require a large area of private property to be set aside so that a slope gentle 
enough to climb could be built.  
Using his laptop, one of my urban planning colleagues generated a few images of what 
the planned seawall would look like once it was in place. These images made it clear to the 
locals that the seawall would cause many problems. Aside from the inconvenience to local 
fishermen, it made visible that the seawall would cover an important shrine on the tip of the 
cape enclosing the cove. Paradoxically, it would also put the fukkouchis at greater risk. 
From the time of their construction after the tsunami of 1933, the fukkouchis have not 
suffered any damage due to subsequent tsunamis. However, if the new seawalls were built 
higher than the fukkouchis, and a future tsunami were to overflow the seawalls, these areas 
would not be able to survive undamaged. People objected to the idea that the shrine should 
be disturbed or dismantled, and to the possibility that the fukkouchis might be flooded.  
As people started to imagine the planned seawall in the context of the preexisting 
elements of the landscape, they became better able to imagine the problems the wall would 
likely cause. This restarted the debate, which became increasingly complicated as it began 
to show divisions in the village, with residents taking sides according to their neighborhoods, 
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occupations, ages, and so on. This back-and-forth continued for months. Finally, in the 
spring of 2013, the residents’ association submitted a request to the municipality for a 12-
meter seawall, which would not cover the shrine or the fukkouchis, but which would 
preserve the existing places in town with clear views of the sea. Interestingly, whether 
knowingly or not, they chose a height that would allow them to see the village from the sea 
as well.  
Our group contributed to the negotiations with the local municipality and the 
prefectural government. Not surprisingly, the local municipality and prefectural government 
hesitated to accept the request. Negotiations stalled for months. Suddenly, in the summer of 
2013, the municipality came up with a brand new option of 11.6 meters, claiming that the 
calculations on which they had based their former recommendation of 14 meters had been 
incorrect. To be honest, we were amazed. Though we were not sure if a miscalculation had 
really occurred, we decided not to investigate the true reason for the changed 
recommendation. Regardless, the height of the proposed seawall now conformed to the local 
request. Like ‘14.1’, ‘11.6’ is just a number, yet both local people and the municipality gave 
these numbers powerful meanings. 
At this point I want to draw your attention to two things about this story. First is the 
way in which the vision and visualization of the local people entered into the negotiations. 
With help from urban planners, the disadvantages of the planned seawall became visible. 
Visually integrating the planned seawall into the existing landscape enabled the villagers to 
see the need for an alternative proposal. In other words, the planners provided a virtual 
infrastructure that enabled local people to examine the planned infrastructure more 
realistically and more seriously. Second is the fact that this seemingly easy victory was 
actually only a temporary settlement that permitted the reconstruction process to move 
forward (cf. Kimura, 2015). Although the local people’s request was apparently 
straightforward -- simply a matter of lowering the height -- it actually reflected an 
assortment of opinions. Many things remain to be discussed, both among the villagers and 
between the villagers and the municipality. These topics include the details of the 
architecture of the seawall and the establishment of an organization to manage the proposed 
park and forest. Thus far, in any case, the most significant progress has been made through 
‘continually seeking new connections’ (Fortun, 2001: 5-6). Through their efforts to visualize 
the seawall as it relates to the landscape, locals have been able to maintain their commitment 
to the seawall, while also striving to keep it in a form that will be locally meaningful.  
In the spring of 2015, Konno-san and his two children moved out of their temporary 
housing. Their new home is a public apartment house for tsunami-afflicted families. In this 
brand-new four-story building, they are beginning their lives again. In Maehama, new 
monuments have been installed, a forest on higher ground has been cleared and the land 
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developed into a new fukkouchi. The fishing ports are back in a shape similar to the time 
prior to the 2011 tsunami. However slowly, the process of recovery advances as people 
gradually add new elements to their lives and their landscapes. 
 
Concluding remarks 
In this paper I have narrated the story of one small village’s complex responses to the 
prospect of seawall reconstruction. Prior to the tsunami, the existing seawall, an outcome of 
the government’s structure-centric approach to disaster management, was an unnoticed 
element of the coastal landscape. However, tsunami created ‘overflow,’ making the seawall 
‘visible upon breakdown.’ The response of the government was to propose the building of 
even larger structures. Meant to protect the communities, these walls were meant to slowly 
become unremarkable, fading into the background of community life. They would also 
make the sea itself invisible. Meanwhile, the local community also developed reconstruction 
plans for the area. In contrast to government plans, these focused on marking the boundaries 
of the high-water line with trees or stakes. These elements were specifically meant to remain 
visible, keeping the memory of the dimensions of the tsunami alive. 
 These strategies for infrastructuring the environment with a view to mitigating the 
risk of future catastrophe vary not least because of their different assumptions about 
infrastructure itself. Whereas the government solution is based on a quantitative and 
technical understanding of infrastructure, and therefore zooms in on the height of the 
solutions as the key parameter, local discussions emphasize numerous other aspects. In 
particular, they introduce into their considerations qualitative dimensions, including 
whether it will be possible to see the sea and other landmarks, such as shrines, whether high 
areas will suffer increased risk, and whether it will be possible to remember the catastrophe. 
 Here I have explored these contrasting perspectives on safety infrastructure with a 
specific view to what they teach about the relation between infrastructure, visibility and 
invisibility. The governmental seawall solution lives up to the conventional idea of 
infrastructure as large (in that sense visible) structures that are nevertheless meant to operate 
silently in the background (and in that sense become unremarkable). However, the wall 
would make other things unremarkable too. It creates a scenario of fading memory, since it 
poses no obligations for people to remember previous events and tragedies. And it renders 
the sea itself invisible, with negative consequences for every day lives and for evacuation 
in the face of a new disaster. In contrast the commemorative markers operate by keeping 
infrastructure visible, memorable and thus remarkable.  
 As the case also suggests, however, there is not necessarily a total opposition 
between these approaches to infrastructuring the environment for safety. Over time, a 
solution was negotiated in which boundary markers would complement a lowered wall, in 
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a way that would, so to speak, mix the visibilities. This demonstrates that ongoing efforts to 
maintain the relation of communities with their infrastructures can help keep it visible and 
remarkable. This unfolding situation is indicative of an intricate and transformable, rather 
than binary and static, relation between the visibility and invisibility of infrastructure. 
In the case of Maehama, the proposed new seawall became visible to local people when 
the urban planners placed its image in a virtual landscape. Presented with a virtual image of 
the real landscape, local people realized that the proposed seawall was much higher than 
they had expected. As this shows, the seawall is not the only infrastructure of consequence 
in this story. The segmentation of the coastline generated ‘scientific’ evidence about the 
environment for the government. And the urban planner’s virtual image facilitated the local 
people’s reaction.  
Finally, implied by their commitment to preserving a view of the sea, the local 
landscape as a whole is also a form of infrastructure for people’s everyday lives. These 
interrelated infrastructures in Maehama underpin the delicately negotiated temporal shifts 
between visibility and invisibility, which have held my attention in this paper.  
After a disaster like the 2011 tsunami, a student of science and technology must remain 
committed to improving the lives of the survivors. Here I have suggested that this entails 
paying close attention to dynamic transformation of infrastructure, which seems able to 
continuously incorporating new elements – from higher seawalls to cherry blossoms. The 
ultimate aim, however, is to enable people to move forward after the disaster. 
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